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FROM BLACK ROBES TO WHITE LAB
COATS: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
A JUDGE'S SUA SPONTE, EXPARTE
ACQUISITION OF SOCIAL AND OTHER
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE DURING THE
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 1
GEORGE D. MARLOw 2
'This thesis is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Ju-
dicial Studies degree awarded jointly by the National Judicial College and The Uni-
versity of Nevada, Reno. The Masters of Judicial Studies program is a formal course
of study for judges and is conducted for the most part on the campus of the Univer-
sity of Nevada, Reno. Judges who are so inclined may matriculate and earn the
masters degree. The program has been in existence since 1986, and it has been at-
tended by approximately 175 judges from nearly every state in the union and three
foreign countries. To date, a masters degree has been earned by fifty eight judges. It
is the only program of its kind in the United States, offering a degree specially
suited for trial court judges.
2 The author is a Dutchess County Court Judge, and he has been a member of
the New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics since the Committee
was created in 1987 by then Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt. The
author and his twenty judicial colleagues have participated in crafting more than
sixteen hundred ethics opinions, which the Committee has issued in response to
written inquiries by sitting judges and announced candidates for elective judicial
office. Each inquiring judge and judicial candidate has sought the Committee's
guidance in applying the New York State Chief Administrative Judge's Rules Gov-
erning Judicial Conduct to specific situations.
The author's interest in the subject of sua sponte research and ex parte com-
munications of judges intensified following his 1996 appointment as the Commit-
tee's co-chair as well as from the Committee's earlier participation in the 1996 revi-
sion of New York's judicial conduct rules. In 1994, New Yorles Chief Administrative
Judge charged the New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics with re-
viewing the American Bar Association's 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct. By
1994, the New York State Bar Association had adopted the Model Code in a modi-
fied form. The Committee's role was to compare the 1990 ABA and the 1994 New
York versions of the Model Code with the then existing New York Chief Adminis-
trative Judge's Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Chief Administrative Judge
invited the Committee to comment and to make recommendations for a revised set
of rules to govern (1) New York State's approximately 3,400 full and part-time
elected and appointed judges, (2) candidates for elective judicial office, and (3) vari-
ous judicial hearing officers. The Committee studied all three sets of rules for nearly
a year, and under the leadership of its former chair, retired Appellate Division Jus-
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"Justice does hold true scales but it is not blind, nor should it
be."
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein3
I. INTRODUCTION
As scientific and technological issues appear in litigation
more frequently and become more complex, judges will be in-
clined to conduct their own research in order to understand fully
the questions facing the court. In Judicial Use of Social Science
Research,4 John Monahan and Laurens Walker propose that
judges, during and as part of the decision-making process, may
search for "legislative facts"5 "through sua sponte library re-
search" 6 and may consider empirical and social science research
that they discovered by "searching for it themselves." In their
later text, Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials,8 they re-
peat the same thought. At first blush, this suggestion appears at
odds with orthodox American notions of due process and with
traditional ethical concepts that discourage and prohibit judges
from allowing, initiating, and considering any ex parte communi-
cations pertaining to cases pending or impending before them.9
tice Samuel J. Silverman, the Committee submitted proposals in 1995. The new
rules became effective January 1, 1996, after New York's Chief Judge, Honorable
Judith S. Kaye, in consultation with the Administrative Board of the State of New
York, promulgated the current Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of
the Courts Governing Judicial Conduct. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §
100 (1996). Section 100 is divided into six subsections and, in general, sets forth the
obligations and duties ofjudges in New York.
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 469, 539 (1994).
4 John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991) [hereinafter Judicial Use of Social Science Re-
search].
5 See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (defining and explaining
"legislative facts").6 Judicial Use of Social Science Research, supra note 4, at 574.
7 Id. at 575.
a JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 499-500 (3d ed. 1994) [hereinafter SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW].
9 See PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 98-99 (1972)
(discussing how the use of extra-legal facts was castigated when it conflicted with
the Court's restrictive vision of substantive due process); Steven L. Winter, Inde-
terminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441,
1460-62 (1990) (discussing the century-old debate concerning judicial activism and
the influence of the famous dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis-the "Great
Dissenters"--which opposed judicial interference with social and economic legisla-
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However, as this article will demonstrate, certain limited steps
can be taken to allow judges to acquire scientific and technologi-
cal information through ex parte and sua sponte research, while
still protecting due process rights.
The ethical dilemma posed by Monahan and Walker begins
with a general proscription against ex parte communications ini-
tiated by or with a judge while a case is pending, impending, or
within the decision-making process.0 While the 1990 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and its adopted versions in New
York and in other states contain specific exceptions to that pro-
hibition," none explicitly permits judges to engage in non-legal
library research or in any form of ex parte fact-finding in order to
help judges correctly address vexing scientific questions raised in
pending legal disputes. On the other hand, it could be argued
that nothing in the current rules expressly and specifically for-
bids the kind of library exploration suggested by Monahan and
Walker. 2 Thus, the core issue of this article is joined: may
judges, while a case is pending or impending, and as part of the
decision-making process, ethically engage in independent library
or internet research, sua sponte and ex parte, to uncover, review,
and consider legislative facts, social framework evidence, and
other social, scientific and technological studies that affect the
outcome of a case but are not adduced by the parties to the liti-
gation?13
tion). For an illustration of the traditional notion that judges should restrain them-
selves from ex parte communications, see the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(1997), which provides in Canon 3B(7):
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications...
concerning a pending or impending proceeding [except in certain pre-
scribed circumstances] .... (b) [a] judge may obtain the advice of a disin-
terested expert on the law... [i]f the judge gives notice to the parties of
the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the par-
ties reasonable opportunity to respond .... (e) [a] judge may initiate or
consider any ex parte communications when expressly authorized by law to
do so.10 See Judicial Use of Social Science Research, supra note 4, at 582-84.
" See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 22, § 100.3(B)(6) (prohibiting judicial
consideration of ex parte communications except in limited circumstances); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7) (1997) (proscribing ex parte communica-
tions except in certain circumstances); see also supra note 9 (setting forth ex parte
communications restrictions in Canon 3(B)(7)).
12 See Judicial Use of Social Science Research, supra note 4, at 574-76
(analogizing evaluation of scientific research to evaluation of case law).
'3 For other articles discussing issues related to the thesis of this article, see
John R. Allison, Combinations of Decision-making Functions, Ex Parte Communica-
1998]
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Given the changing legal atmosphere today, modifications of
the rules concerning sua sponte, ex parte research may be forth-
coming. The overwhelming majority of states, in varying de-
grees, have revised their judicial conduct codes since the adop-
tion of the modified ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct in
1990.'4 Much of that revision has been based upon the new ABA
Model Code. 5 Therefore, the American legal system is likely to
still be open to considering further clarification of and useful
changes in current rules. Moreover, in the wake of the 1993
United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
tions, and Related Biasing Influences: A Process-Value Analysis, 1993 UTAH L. REV.
1135, 1197 (1993) (defining and discussing ex parte communications); Kenneth Culp
Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1986) (advocating for legislative
lawmaking over judicial lawmaking because the courts do not have access to the
same information to which the legislature has access); Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial
Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945 (1955) (discussing what the author believes to be de-
ficiencies in the judicial notice provisions of the evidence rules and offering alterna-
tives); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Adminis-
trative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942) (discussing courts' uses of facts
outside of the record); David Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value
of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989)
(discussing the role of social science in the law and proposing a framework by which
its value can be assessed); C.T. Harhut, Ex Parte Communications Initiated by a
Presiding Judge, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 673 (1994) (addressing the lack of clear
authority pertaining to judges' ex parte communications); John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in
Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 513-14 (1986) [hereinafter Social Authority] (approving
of an appellate court's authority to cite information not cited by the lower court
when dealing with social science research); John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical
Assessment of Novel Scientific Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497 (1990) (discussing
various admissibility standards for scientific evidence).
14 The author surveyed most of the fifty states in order to ascertain whether any
states have ethics code provisions directly relevant to the core issue of this paper.
Apparently, no state has such a code provision. Additionally, the author searched
relevant code commentaries and conducted an extensive case law search. The re-
sults are incorporated in the body of this article.
15 See Leslie Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 949, 950 n.3 (1996) (listing the jurisdictions that have adopted the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct); Lisa L. Milford, States Consider Adopting the 1990 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, 13 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 1 (1992) (discussing state legisla-
tive movement to adopt portions of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct);
Memorandum from Cynthia Gray, Esq., Director, Center for Judicial Conduct Or-
ganizations, American Judicature Society (July 1997) (entitled States' Consideration
of the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct) (on file with author). The author
wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Ms. Cynthia Gray for her kind assis-
tance during this project. She and her organization provide an enormously valuable
resource to the judiciary.
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Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 which superseded the seventy year old
Frye doctrine in some state courts and in federal courts,17 the
judiciary's role in considering all types of scientific evidence has
been rapidly evolving, expanding, and undergoing re-
examination by legal scholars, judges, and lawyers everywhere. 18
Also, modern America has seen an immense eruption of social
and physical science research.' 9 New scientific data, research re-
sults, and novel theories are advanced and published in virtually
every field.0 Together, these forces create pressure, which can
sometimes be quite intense,2 1 to give these new theories and
'6 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert Court held that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal
trial. Id. at 587-89. Under the Daubert standard, the Frye doctrine's requirement
that the scientific method be "generally accepted" in the scientific community is not
a determinative factor in considering the admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. at
588-89. Instead, it is simply a factor among many. See id. at 594.
17 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye doctrine
states that, in determining whether to admit scientific expert evidence, the court
must examine whether the scientific method has attained "general acceptance"
within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 1014.
18 See James Richardson, Dramatic Changes in American Expert Evidence Law:
From Frye to Daubert, 2(1) JUD. REV. 13 (1994) (discussing the increased role of the
judiciary in analyzing and considering scientific data).
On June 16, 1997, A Conference of the Manhattan Institute's Center For Judi-
cial Studies and the New York Academy of Sciences held a seminar entitled "Justice
and 'Junk Science:' Toward a Better Relationship Between Science, the Courts, and
Society." This conference primarily dealt with issues surrounding the explosion of
science into the justice system.
" See Alexander Morgan Capron, Daubert and the Quest for Value Free
"Scientific Knowledge" in the Courtroom, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 85, 85 (1996)
(commenting on the continuous expansion of scientific research and its effects on
our courtrooms); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Be-
fore Brown, 1985 DUKE L. J. 624, 665 n.227 (1985) (noting that over the last few
decades, scientific research has increased in the areas of race and I.Q.).
20 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 132 (N.Y. 1990) (acknowledging
the need, in certain circumstances, for expert testimony regarding rape trauma
syndrome); People v. Castro, 540 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding the use
of DNA fingerprinting admissible in criminal cases); Victoria Slind-Flor, Fertile
Fields of Litigation: Did Power-Line Radiation Cause Cancer?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26,
1993, at 1 (discussing the theory that electromagnetic fields from a utility company's
high-voltage power lines may cause cancer).
21 The author was a Judge of The New York State Family Court from 1984 to
1992. It was during that period and thereafter that a robust national legal debate
raged over the scientific validity of the Child Sex Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(the "Syndrome), and whether expert opinion testimony regarding the Syndrome
that is offered to corroborate claims of child sex abuse should be admissible as evi-
dence in a court. In 1987, New York found such testimony sufficiently reliable and
therefore acceptable as corroborative evidence in In re Nicole V., 518 N.E.2d 914,
917-18 (N.Y. 1987). Other states have drawn similar conclusions. See, e.g., Stevens
1998] 295
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findings a home in the courtroom.' Consequently, modern
v. People, 796 P.2d 946, 948 (Colo. 1990); State v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (Haw.
1982), overruled by State v. Batangan, 799 P.2d 48, 54 (Haw. 1990) (advising trial
courts to admit such expert testimony cautiously); State v. Sandberg, 392 N.W.2d
298, 302-03 (Minn. 1986); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220-21 (Or. 1983). On
the other hand, there are many courts and scholars who genuinely doubt the scien-
tific reliability and viability of the Syndrome in the truth-finding process. See, e.g.,
People v. Nelson, 561 N.E.2d 439, 443 (IMI. 1990); In re Gina D., 645 A.2d 61, 65
(N.H. 1994); see generally Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sex Abuse Syndrome: The
Other Major Issue in State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POLY & L. 399 (1995) (discussing the controversy over behavioral syndrome
testimony in child sex abuse cases); James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Ap-
plying Daubert To Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10 (1995)
(noting the difficulty in applying the Supreme Court's guidelines with respect to
Syndrome evidence).
2 For a look at the reaction of the New York Court of Appeals when confronted
with the pressure to employ new theories in court, see People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1994), and the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Kaye, where she wisely
observes that "[iut is not for a court to take pioneering risks on promising new sci-
entific techniques, because premature admission both prejudices litigants and short-
circuits debate necessary to determination of the accuracy of a technique." Id. at 462
n.4 (Kaye, C.J., concurring); see also People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y.
1996) (ruling that narrowly tailored testimony about neonaticide syndrome is in-
admissible without a Frye hearing to determine its reliability); In re Nicole V., 518
N.E.2d 914, 916-18 (N.Y. 1987) (recognizing the child sex abuse syndrome as a le-
gally cognizable diagnosis to corroborate other evidence of child abuse); People v.
Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 485 (N.Y. 1983) (overturning conviction, in part, due to
wrongful admission of rape victim's post-hypnotic recollections); People v. Serrano,
631 N.Y.S.2d 340, 341 (App. Div. 1995) (denying defendant's request for a hearing to
determine admissibility of expert testimony regarding use of analysis based on
scanning electron microscope); People v. Burton, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 977 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (disallowing acute grief syndrome defense); People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d
715, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (discussing the admissibility of expert psychiatric testi-
mony); People v. Smith, 459 N.Y.S.2d 528, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (declining to com-
pletely bar all post-hypnotic testimonial discrepancies); cf. Williamson v. Reynolds,
904 F. Supp. 1529, 1556 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (finding the admission of a hair sample
comparison under the Daubert test in a capital case to be error), affd sub nom. Wil-
liamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997); Smith v. State, 677 So.2d 1240,
1249 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (permitting conflicting DNA evidence to be submitted to
the jury); State v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294, 300 (Ariz. 1996) (admitting DNA probabil-
ity calculations based on the modified ceiling method); State v. Hunter, 694 A.2d
1317, 1318 (Conn. 1997) (holding polygraph testing as per se inadmissible evidence);
State v. Ruthardt, 680 A-2d 349, 356 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (admitting certain blood
alcohol testing procedures subject to specialized expert testimony and prejudicial
limitations); People v. Haywood, 530 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
bloodstain interpretation evidence admissible); State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 670
(Or. 1995) (holding admissible the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test to prove that the
defendant-driver was under the influence of alcohol); State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347,
1353-56 (R.I. 1996) (upholding the trial court's decision to allow expert testimony on
the statistical significance of DNA analysis); State v. Moeller, 548 N.W.2d 465, 481
(S.D. 1996) (acknowledging the polymenase chain reaction DNA typing procedure as
a valid method of forensic identification); State v. Jones, 922 P.2d 806, 810-811
296 [Vol. 72:291
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judges increasingly find themselves acting as gatekeepers in or-
der to moderate, regulate, and edit the flow of science that rou-
tinely looks across legal thresholds for endorsement.2 In this
role, judges are forced to render decisions on a wide variety of
scientific subjects in which probably most judges do not have ex-
tensive formal training or experience.'
New York Court of Appeal's Chief Judge Kaye's concurring
opinion in People v. Wesley' plainly illustrates the relevance of
the core issue of this article. Her opinion reaffirms the notion
that courts facing the task of resolving the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence must consider "whether, theoretically, the ac-
cepted techniques, when performed as they should be, generate
results generally accepted as reliable within the scientific com-
munity."26 Although Chief Judge Kaye made this statement in
the context of describing the Frye doctrine, 7 which provides that
scientific expert evidence is admissible when it has been
"generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community, the
statement, in large measure, remains valid in describing the fed-
eral standards recently set forth in Daubert. The Daubert Court
placed continuing emphasis on the question of whether a novel
theory or technique has attained widespread acceptance in a
particular area of the scientific community as a relevant, but not
a dispositive, factor in assessing its reliability; instead, the Court
cited numerous factors that federal courts should consider in de-
(Wash. 1996) (finding DNA probability evidence based on the interim ceiling princi-
ple admissible); United States v. Bush, 44 M.J. 646, 647 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996)
(admitting the use of chemical hair analysis to establish the accused's use of co-
caine), affd, 47 M.J. 305 (C-AA.F. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1048 (1998).
2See Peter W. Huber & Kenneth R. Foster, Science in the Courts, Center for
Judicial Studies, THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, Civil Justice Memo No. 33 (Sept.
1997).
24 See Richardson et al., supra note 18, at 11 (noting that Daubert places the
onus of determining whether scientific evidence should be presented to the jury, on
judges, compelling them to participate in fact-construction); Weinstein, supra note
3, at 555 (discussing how judges can overcome their lack of scientific training when
presiding over massive tort cases requiring expert evidence). Judges have occa-
sionally lamented their lack of training in technical subject areas which they must
understand in order to issue informed rulings. For example, see Morgan v. Ker-
rigan, 530 F.2d 401, 421 n.29 (1st Cir. 1976), where the court wrote: "[tihroughout
this series of submissions this court has been burdened with reports written for so-
ciologists by sociologists utilizing sophisticated statistical and mathematical tech-
niques. We lack the expertise to evaluate these studies on the merits."
.633 N.E.2d 451, 461-68 (N.Y. 1994).
26 Id. at 462.
27 See id.
1998]
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termining the admissibility of scientific evidence.' Regardless of
whether a judge must determine reliability under either the Frye
or the Daubert standard, some judges will likely be tempted to
look beyond the submitted materials, literature, and testimony
to ascertain how a new technique or theory is regarded by other
scientists.29 Therefore, this seems a particularly apt moment in
legal history to consider whether modern standards of judicial
ethics should be adjusted to permit judges to engage in sua
sponte, ex parte research while a case is pending or impending
and, if so, how they may go about it without forsaking funda-
mental due process rights.
A. A Personal Anecdote: The Inclination to Look Beyond the
Record in Family Court
Perhaps the following personal anecdote will help to demon-
strate how this issue can arise. In 1988, when I was a New York
State Family Court Judge, I decided a sex abuse/parental rights
termination case, unquestionably the most difficult one in my
then nine-year judicial career. In Dutchess County Department
of Social Services ex rel. T.G. v. Mr. and Mrs. G.,"o the respon-
dent couple had been found by two separate courts (one in Geor-
gia and one in New York) to have sexually abused the wife's four
year old twin children of a prior marriage. Under New York's
statutory permanency planning scheme, I had previously ordered
28 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) ("A 'reliability
assessment does not require, although it does permit,... an express determination
of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.' ") (quoting United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (D. Or. 1996) (finding that expert evi-
dence has to qualify as scientific knowledge and be sufficiently reliable as required
by Daubert); Stan Kitzinger, Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-Bye to Frye:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 58 ALB. L. REV. 575, 597-98 (1994)
(analyzing the list of factors set forth in Daubert for determining reliability of evi-
dence); Alan W. Tamarelli, Jr., Recent Development, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability-The Questionable Wisdom
of Abandoning the Peer Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1175, 1192 (1994) (discussing the non-determinative characteristic of the
general acceptance factor under the Daubert test).
In July of 1997, at a judicial seminar in Tarrytown devoted to "Scientific Proof
and Expert Witnesses in New York," it was pointed out by Herald Price Fahringer, a
highly regarded trial attorney, that as of July 9, 1997, Daubert had been cited or
discussed in 643 federal cases. Herald Price Fahringer, Remarks at the Judicial
Seminar on Scientific Proof and Expert Witnesses in New York (July 1997).
30 534 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Faro. Ct. 1988).
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the couple into treatment in 1985 to give them the opportunity to
overcome the behavioral disorder which had several months ear-
lier resulted in the temporary, court-ordered foster care place-
ment of T.G., their biological eighteen month old son.3'
My goal was to afford these parents an opportunity to com-
plete a process of treatment so they could eventually be trusted
to provide T.G. with a safe, abuse-free home. Although they co-
operated with the treatment plan in most respects for an ex-
tended period of time, they both adamantly and consistently re-
fused to admit during the therapeutic process that they had
sexually abused the children, even though they were twice found
to have committed the abuse. Absent their acknowledgment that
they abused the children, the attending psychologists opined
that the respondents could not be successfully treated and con-
sequently they could not be trusted to provide a safe home for
their little boy. 2
Whether a person's parental rights could be permanently
terminated under those circumstances pursuant to New York
law33 was an issue which, until then, had never been the subject
of a published decision by a New York court, and none was found
elsewhere.
Recognizing the magnitude of the issue, the Dutchess
County Department of Social Services' attorney, Kathryn Lazar,
adduced exceptionally strong scientific testimony to support the
agency's contention that successful treatment was unlikely in
the absence of an admission by these parents that they had acted
abusively toward Mrs. G's children.' The department requested
termination of the couple's parental rights on the ground that
they would likely never be able to assure T.G.'s safety.35 After a
lengthy hearing, I concurred, ending respondents' parental
rights and freeing this little boy (and, later, his afterborn
brother) for adoption. That decision was affirmed on appeal by
the Second Department of New York's Appellate Divisiony, the
State's intermediate appellate court. The other three of New
York's four appellate departments have since approved this
"' See In re T.G., 491 N.Y.S.2d 901, 908 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
32 See Dutchess County, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
'3 See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1997-98).
34 See Dutchess County, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 67-69.
5 See id. at 65.
38 See id. at 71-72.
37 See In re Travis Lee G., 565 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (App. Div. 1991).
19981
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principle as well.38
The struggle to evaluate properly the scientific opinion tes-
timony in that case was substantial given my limited scientific
training.39 However, the task of reaching a just decision was
significantly advanced by Dutchess County's decision to call as
an expert witness one of America's leading authorities on the
treatment of sex offenders, Dr. Judith V. Becker, an associate
professor of clinical psychology in psychiatry at the Columbia
College of Physicians and Surgeons.0 Dr. Becker's testimony
was clear, well-reasoned, well-documented, and exceptionally
articulate.
However, notwithstanding Dr. Becker's compelling testi-
mony, I was nevertheless inclined to search for and assess sci-
entific research results outside the record to confirm or challenge
Dr. Becker's views. In my opinion, this case underscores the vi-
tal need for judges to be occasionally permitted and encouraged
to reach beyond evidence presented by the parties and to obtain
additional scientific research material in order to render the cor-
rect decision. Although the temptation to look beyond the record
was considerable, the rules governing judicial conduct at the
time did not invite such ventures.4' Hence, in light of the
38 See In re Rebecca D., 635 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 1995) (finding that re-
spondent's inability to address the abuse that led to removal of the children from
the home was inadequate for the future safety of the children); In re Commitment of
Guardianship and Custody of Diana Crystal D., 606 N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (App. Div.
1994) (upholding decision to terminate parental rights because evidence established
that respondent permanently neglected his children by failing to plan for their fu-
ture); In re Kayte "M.," 608 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming the family
court's decision that the child was permanently neglected, thereby terminating re-
spondent's parental rights).
39 My experience with this case reinforced my belief in the wisdom of the statu-
tory obligation contained in the New York Family Court Act, which mandates
"i] udges of the family court [to] also be familiar with areas of learning and practice
that often are not supplied by the practice of law." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 141
(McKinney 1983).
40 See Dutchess County, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 65, 67-68.
41 In the context of child protective proceedings, this need to look beyond the
evidence in the record is greater than in other matters for numerous reasons: first,
the evidence is often ambiguous and rarely overwhelming, second, the overall pic-
ture can change very quickly; and third, the stakes for the child and the parents are
very high.
Although the ex parte information was of a very different character and was ac-
quired in a very different way in In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 133 (N.Y. 1992),
the New York Court of Appeal's willingness to depart from its usual procedures to
act on information obtained outside the traditional record on appeal in order to pro-
tect the welfare and safety of children is evident. In that case, the majority
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amount of activity and thought in the judicial-legal community
about judicial ethics, the time seems suitable to examine and re-
think this narrow aspect of the exparte communications rules.42
B. Assumptions
The underlying premise of this article is that often trial and
appellate judges alike face the issue of whether they should re-
sort to sua sponte, ex parte research, notwithstanding their in-
herently separate and distinct roles and positions in the justice
system vis a vis the litigants, the lawyers, and the fact-finding
process itself. While one could argue that any rules governing
sua sponte, ex parte research should apply consistently at every
judicial tier because the underlying principles and concerns af-
fecting the content of these rules are in many ways parallel at
each level of the judiciary, this article's focus is principally on
trial level judges for a number of reasons: scientific evidence is
first proffered and analyzed at the trial level;' each trial judge
must face these often momentous and daunting decisions alone;
the parties at the trial level may not be able to afford to hire ex-
pert witnesses to prove a theory;" and decisions about science
are often not challenged on appeal.45 Whether any new rule
stretched beyond the record on appeal and relied on new factual information to pro-
tect a child at risk.
42 See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation:
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43
EMORY L.J. 995, 1029-30 (1994) (analyzing the issue of ex parte communication be-
tween the judge and the appointed expert during the course of litigation); Harhut,
supra note 13, at 673 (discussing rules governing ex parte communications between
a presiding judge and a third party, including other judges).
See generally Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-
Daubert World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2011-12 (1996) (explaining that under the
Daubert test, the Court delegated to trial judges the role of assessing the admission
of scientific testimony as part of the gatekeeping process); Holley Davis Thames,
Comment, Frye Gone, But Not Forgotten in the Wake of Daubert New Standards
and Procedures for Admissibility of Scientific Expert Opinion, 63 MISS. L.J. 473, 489
(1994) (discussing the roles of trial judges and juries in considering the admissibility
of scientific expert testimony).
See Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific
"Objectivity," 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1993) (commenting on the growth of an
expert witness "industry" to provide witnesses to parties that are able to afford
them); David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in
Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 281, 288 (1990) (denoting the inability of an indigent
in some cases "to assert legitimate claims or defenses solely because of her inability
to hire an expert witness").
45 See Carl F. Cranor et al., Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Con-
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should apply equally to appellate judges is an issue best left for
another day.46
Similarly, while the concept of judicial notice47 is somewhat
related to the issue of the judicial use of scientific research in-
formation obtained ex parte, it involves significantly different
ethical implications. Therefore, judicial notice as it may relate to
sua sponte and ex parte research is not treated in this article.
Furthermore, based on many conversations with judges from
New York and other states with diverse demographic back-
grounds, and upon the dearth of literature on the precise issue of
this article, this article assumes that relatively few judges have
attempted to analyze this issue in depth. Indeed, I contacted the
federal and all of the thirty-nine state judicial ethics advisory
committees, and received a response from a majority of the
committees. From those responding, there appear to be no ethics
opinions written by any of them regarding this article's core is-
sue.
C. Definitions
This paper relies on the following definitions:
An ex parte communication is an oral or a written utterance
by a person or a party, to a judge, about the substantive or pro-
cedural merits of a pending or impending lawsuit that may affect
the outcome of the case.48 An ex parte communication is one de-
livered to the judge or made in the judge's presence, without the
knowledge of, and normally outside the presence of, at least one
49
of the parties to the case.Sua sponte is a phrase used to characterize a self-initiated
text-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18 (1996) (discussing the standard of review regarding a
trial judge's decision on the admissibility of scientific evidence, which in most cir-
cuits allows overturning only if "manifestly erroneous").46 For an interesting discussion of the issue of this article and related issues in
the context of appellate level litigation, see George R. Currie, Appellate Courts Use
of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investi-
gation, 1960 WIS. L. REV. 39 (1960).
4 See 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201.1 (4th
ed. 1996) (explaining the doctrine of judicial notice that allows acceptance of matters
as true without formal evidentiary proof).
48 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1994) (defining ex parte communication); Association
of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 632 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, J.,
concurring) (same); Allison, supra note 13, at 1197 (same).
'9 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
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decision or act of a judge,50 as distinguished from an act or deci-
sion of a judge undertaken at the behest of, or in response to a
request, act, or statement of an attorney or a party.
Sub judice describes the period of time during which a
pending case is being heard and considered for decision by a
court.r
Adjudicative fact is a phrase defined by Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis in An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Ad-
ministrative Process,52 as follows: "When [a court] finds facts con-
cerning immediate parties-what the parties did, what the cir-
cumstances were, what the background conditions were-the
[court] is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may
conveniently be called adjudicative facts."' The concept is again
explained in Bowling v. Department of Insurance,' where Judge
Smith referred to "adjudicative facts" as "garden-variety" and
"conventional" facts.55 Hence, "adjudicative facts" refers to facts
established through testimony and physical exhibits introduced
by the parties in an adversarial setting at hearings and trials.
Legislative facts are also defined by Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis as follows: "When [a court] wrestles with a question of law
or policy, it is acting legislatively,.., and the facts which inform
its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legis-
lative facts."56 Monahan and Walker define "legislative facts,"
distinguishing them from "adjudicative facts," in the following
way:
Legislative facts... are facts that courts use when they make
law (or "legislate"), rather than simply apply settled doctrine to
resolve a dispute between particular parties to a case. While
the determination of adjudicative facts affects only the litigants
before the court, the determination of legislative facts influences
the content of legal doctrine itself, and therefore affects many
parties in addition to those who brought the case.57
Social framework evidence, according to Monahan and
Walker, refers to "general conclusions from social science re-
See id. at 1424.5' See id. at 1425.
52 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
"Id. at 402.
4 394 So. 2d 165, 174 (Fla. 1981).
A Id.
"Davis, supra note 52, at 402.
57 SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW, supra note 8, at 129.
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search in determining factual issues in a specific case." "
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The inclination of most courts to look beyond traditional
adjudicative facts and live expert testimony is not a new phe-
nomenon. In the early twentieth century, courts, in rendering
decisions with long range significance, began to consider legisla-
tive facts developed as the result of scientific or other research.
However, they limited themselves to materials cited by the par-
ties in their briefs.59 Recently, that limitation has given rise to a
review of this ethics issue. For example, modern legal scholars,
such as John Monahan and Laurens Walker, have advocated
that "as courts are free to find legal precedents that the parties
have not presented, they should also have the power to locate
68 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1987); see also Teresa S. Renaker, Eviden-
tiary Legerdemain: Deciding When Daubert Should Apply to Social Science Evi-
dence, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1687 (1996) (stating that one of the uses of social sci-
ence evidence is to decide issues of fact specific to the case at hand). This concept
was born from Walker's and Monahan's belief that the Kenneth Culp Davis model,
which defines legislative facts and distinguishes them from adjudicative facts, fails
to give judges guidance about how social science research may be acquired, evalu-
ated, and used to give appropriate effect to legislative facts in a particular case. Be-
cause Davis treats scientific research as fact, rather than as the functional equiva-
lent of legal precedent, Walker and Monahan believe that courts may not
independently search for such research material since, generally, "factual" investi-
gations may not be undertaken by courts without the parties' knowledge, consent,
and participation. They urge that only if courts change their attitudes about social
science research evidence (legislative facts) and view it as having precedential
authority-i.e., social authority similar to case law-may it then conveniently and
effectively enhance the formulation of rules of law. See Walker & Monahan, supra,
at 585-87. They argue that viewing high quality social science research as "social
authority" (legal precedent), instead of treating it as fact, can be done fairly and
without compromising the parties' rights or the reliability of judicial outcomes. See
id. at 585.
'9 See, e.g., David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: Explor-
ing the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
541, 560-61 (1991) (discussing the Court's use of a theory of human relations con-
tained in the party's brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)); Nel Coleman
McCabe, Legislative Facts as Evidence in State Constitutional Search Analysis, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (1992) (stating that the Muller Court used information
contained in the original "Brandeis brief" to aid in its decision). Since the early
twentieth century, courts have conducted independent library research that has
been incorporated into the decision-making process. See Robert E. Keeton, Legisla-
tive Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1, 31-32 (1988) (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to illus-
trate the Court's consideration of evidence beyond the record in deciding fundamen-
tal factual issues presented in the case).
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social science research through independent investigation.""'
The following cases illustrate how some courts have employed
social science research within certain limits.
In the 1908 case Muller v. Oregon,6 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the legality of Oregon's statutory effort to protect women
from health and other risks resulting from working excessively
long hours.62 Attorney Louis Brandeis presented a brief to the
Court containing legislative facts-namely, research reports and
findings, as well as laws from foreign countries and other
states-which convincingly demonstrated a rational and factual
basis for Oregon's legislation limiting the number of hours that
women may work.' The Court overruled precedent and upheld
the Oregon law containing these new labor restrictions.'
Time and again since 1908, judges have reached out for so-
cial science evidence, scientific survey results, legislative facts,
social framework evidence, and other research to support their
legal and factual conclusions.' Among the most well-known and
significant twentieth century examples of judicial use of social
science research to support a legal conclusion is the United
s' Social Authority, supra note 13, at 497 (footnote omitted).
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
6 Id. at 416-17.
r See id. at 419-20 n.1. In a decision written by Justice Brewer, the opinion re-
fers to the corresponding law of nineteen states and seven foreign nations offered in
support of Louis Brandeis' brief to the Court. See id. The Brandeis brief concluded
that women's "maternal fuctions... [were] so important and so far reaching" that
justification for statutory hourly labor restrictions "need hardly be discussed." Id.
6 See id. at 423. It is believed that this is the first major case in which judges
extensively used social scientific studies to justify a legal result. See 16 AM. JUR. 2d
Constitutional Law § 134 (1979) (discussing the Brandeis Brief and its impact on the
courts' use of economic and sociological studies); John M. Conley & David W. Peter-
son, The Science of Gatekeeping: The Federal Judicial Center's New Reference Man-
ual on Scientific Evidence, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1996) (discussing how the
Brandeis Brief was the beginning of the judiciary's "love-hate relationship with sci-
entific evidence"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 628 (1985) (discussing Brandeis' persuasive use of so-
cial science in Muller v. Oregon); Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Es-
say on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAIl L. REV. 263, 304 (1989)
(discussing the Brandeis Brief and stating that it was the first use of social science
evidence in a court's decision). For a complete reading of the Brandeis brief, see
Louis D. BRANDEIS, MULLER V. OREGON, BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT IN ERROR (1907),
reprinted in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (1975).
6 See generally Currie, supra note 46 (discussing various instances when courts
have consulted material outside of the record to aid in their decision-making proc-
ess).
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States Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka,6 where the Court adopted a factual finding of a Kan-
sas court declaring that " '[slegregation of white and colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the col-
ored children.' "' The Supreme Court added that "this finding
[was] amply supported by modern authority."' Then, in a foot-
note of the opinion, the Court cited a list of psychology and social
science literature as supporting authority.
6 9
Similarly, the Court's opinion in Miranda v. Arizona7" is re-
plete with references to studies, analyses of police interrogation
tactics, and other writings relevant to the subject of obtaining
statements from crime suspects.7' The Miranda Court, however,
went further than merely citing sociological studies of varying
descriptions. The Court also referred to the New York Times'
newspaper accounts of cases of police misconduct72 and the Los
Angeles Times' chronicle of cases involving criminal confes-
sions.73
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate public school facilities for black
and white children are inherently unequal).
67 Id. at 494 ("To separate [black children] from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority... that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
68 id.
689 The Court cited the following sources containing the opinions of sociologists
and psychologists: Y-B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON
PERSONALITY AND DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Children
and Youth 1950); WITMER & KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952); Deut-
scher & Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social
Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Ef-
fects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT. J. OPINION AND
ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); BRAMFELD, EDUCATIONAL COSTS, IN DISCRIMINATION
AND NATIONAL WELFARE 44-48 (MacIver ed. 1949); FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE
UNITED STATES 674-681 (1949); and MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). See
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11.
70 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the government may not use statements of
criminal defendants obtained by police questioning unless the police demonstrate
the use of procedural safeguards before such questioning).
71 Id. at 440 (referencing the many scholqrly works pertaining to the Fifth
Amendment rights of suspects in police custody); see also id. at 445 n.5 (identifying
studies undertaken in the 1930s and in 1961 that addressed police interrogation
techniques). These studies concerned the prevalence of "third degree" interrogation
of criminal defendants and thus became relevant to the Court's holding.
72 See id. at 455 n.24 (describing events involving police interrogation tech-
niques that resulted in a suspect making false confessions).
7' See id. at 441 n.3 (discussing the views of a Los Angeles police chief and a
prosecutor regarding the admissibility of improperly obtained confessions).
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In Ballew v. Georgia,74 Justice Blackmun cited several noted
studies of the effects of jury size on decision-making.7" He wrote
that, although "some" of the studies were pressed upon the court
by the parties, the Court "carefully" read them "because they
provide[d] the only basis, besides judicial hunch, for a decision."76
Thus, unlike the Court's opinions in Muller, Brown, and Mi-
randa, it seems that the Ballew Court went beyond the record to
review social science data, which eventually played a part in the
Court's decision-making process. That inference is supported by
Justice Powell's three member concurring opinion criticizing
Justice Blackmun's "heavy reliance" on studies that had not been
"subjected to the traditional testing mechanisms of the adversary
process."77
In the same way, in State v. O'Key,7s the Oregon Supreme
Court conducted "[its] own research"79 and considered "numerous
other sources"" beyond the scientific evidence adduced at a
hearing considering the admissibility of the Horizontal Gaze
Nystagmus test."' Similarly, in State v. Marcus,82 the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court appears to have gone
beyond the proof adduced at a Frye hearing held to determine
the admissibility of DNA evidence in a murder case. The Marcus
court cited a report of the National Research Council issued sub-
sequent to the conclusion of the hearing in order to help deter-
mine the admissibility of the evidence.' The court affirmed the
defendant's murder conviction and held the DNA evidence to be
admissible."
These cases are examples of courts setting their sights either
beyond traditional adjudicative facts or beyond the trial record
74 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
7" Id. at 231 n.10. The Court, for example, acknowledged the prevalence of bias
in small groups as well as the inability of a small group of jurors to remember all of
the facts of the case at bar. See id. at 232-33.
76 Id. at 232.
77 Ballew, 435 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring) (questioning both the
"wisdom" and "necessity" of using such studies).
78 899 P.2d 663 (Or. 1995) (en banc).
79 Id. at 686.
"Id. at 682.
8' Id. at 670 (explaining police administration of the Horizontal Gaze Nystag-
mus field sobriety test in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated).
2 683 A.2d 221 (N.J. 1996).
mSee id. at 227 (citing a pre-publication copy of a 1996 report by the Committee
on DNA Forensic Science of the National Research Council).
"See id. at 233-34.
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itself to discover relevant information "outside the courtroom."'
These decisions demonstrate how conscientious judges will inevi-
tably prize more and better information whenever they attempt
to answer complex, new, or uncommon questions of science.
Nevertheless, because information obtained ex parte has the po-
tential of misleading the court and creating bias on the part of
judges, the rules of judicial conduct must ensure that ex parte
data is received in a balanced way in order to simultaneously
achieve the benefits of better information and to avoid the risks
inherent in its ex parte acquisition.86
III. ETHICS CODE DEVELOPMENT
Society's ideals, as voiced in rules of conduct and comport-
ment for judges, have evolved over centuries to become the rela-
tively well-developed and generally uniform sets of principles ob-
served by modern American judges in all state and federal
courts. The earliest written expectations about judges that this
writer has unearthed are Biblical. In I Deuteronomy, 16-17 and
XVI Deuteronomy 19, it is respectively proclaimed:
And I charged your judges at that time, saying, Hear the causes
between your brethren, and judge righteously between every
man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him. Ye
shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the
small as well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of
man; for the judgment is God's: and the cause that is too hard
for you, bring it unto me, and I will hear it.5 7
Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not
respect persons, neither take a gift: for a gift doth blind
Jay C. Carlisle, Ex Parte Communication by the Judiciary, N.Y. ST. BAR J.,
Nov. 1986, at 12. Professor Carlisle quotes New York's former Chief Judge Charles
Breitel as saying: " TIhe impulse for seeking assistance, of course, is the desire to
learn and to make sure that one's reasoning and conclusions will more likely be cor-
rect. This is done quite often, from what I learn.' " Id. (quoting Honorable Charles
Breitel, Address to a Conference on Judicial Ethics at the Chicago Law School, re-
printed in 154 N.L.J. 1 (Oct. 8, 1965)).
"G See generally Stephan Landsman & Richard J. Rakas, A Preliminary Inquiry
into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Liti-
gation, 12 BEHAV. SC. & L. 113 (1994) (discussing the potential biasing effects of ex
parte material on both judges and jurors).
Deuteronomy 1:16-17 (King James). One could, perhaps with tongue in cheek,
argue that this last command is the earliest attempt to initiate an ex parte commu-
nication.
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the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous.8
One of history's most profound assertions about society's
perceptions of its judges is inscribed in Magna Charta, which il-
lustrates the high priority that society gives to the quality of the
judiciary and to its mission. Magna Charta XLV echoes Deu-
teronomy, defining the judiciary's mission as sacred: 'We will
not make Justiciaries... excepting of such as know the laws of
the land, and are well disposed to observe them."89
Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626), in his essay Of Judicature,
refers to certain key traits that we expect judges to exhibit: these
traits include integrity, patience, restraint, and open-
mindedness. In terms of this article's core issue, Bacon offers an
early clue that prohibitions against ex parte communications
would someday be the norm. He wrote: "'Patience and gravity
of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over speaking
judge is no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to
find that which he might have heard in due time from the Bar.'
"0 This comment can be interpreted in a manner so as to credit
Bacon with being one of the first scholars to emphasize the im-
portance of judges listening to and focusing on the evidence pre-
sented by lawyers instead of trying, sua sponte, to find it else-
where.
In LORD HALE'S RULES FOR HIS JUDICIAL
GUIDANCE: Things Necessary to Be Continually Had in Re-
membrance,91 Sir Matthew Hale set forth a more detailed guide
for judicial behavior. This seventeenth century primer for judi-
cial conduct is simpler than, and different from, our more exten-
sive and detailed modern rules. It reads as follows:
1. That in the administration of justice I am entrusted for God,
the king of the country; and therefore,
2. That it be done, 1st, uprightly; 2ndly, deliberately; 3rdly,
resolutely.
3. That I rest not upon my own understanding or strength, but
Deuteronomy 16:19 (King James).
89 MAGNA CHARTA art. 45 (1215), reprinted in BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE
MAGNA CARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 228, 241 (1993).
90 George D. Marlow, Opinions of the New York State Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics: Their Language and Rhetoric, 69 N.Y. St. B. J. 32 (Nov. 1997).
9' See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1039 n.2 (Fla. 1994)
(reprinting an excerpt from LORD HALES FOR HIs JUDICIAL GUIDANCE, Things Nec-
essary to Be Continually Had in Remembrance).
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implore and rest upon the direction and strength of God.
4. That in the execution of justice I carefully lay aside my own
passions, and do not give way to them, however provoked.
5. That I be wholly intent upon the business I am about, remit-
ting all other cares and thoughts as unseasonable, and inter-
ruptions.
6. That I suffer not myself to be prepossessed with any judg-
ment at all, till the whole business and both parties be heard.
7. That I never engage myself in the beginning of a cause, but
reserve myself unprejudiced till the whole be heard.
8. That in business capital, though my nature prompt me to
pity, yet to consider that there is also pity due to the country.
9. That I be not too rigid in matters purely conscientious, where
all the harm is diversity of judgment.
10. That I be not biased with compassion to the poor or favor to
the rich, in point of justice.
11. That popular or court applause, or distaste, have no influ-
ence upon any thing I do in point of distribution of justice.
12. Not be solicitous what men will say or think, so long as I
keep myself exactly according to the rules of justice.
13. If in criminals it be measuring cast, to incline to mercy and
acquittal.
14. In criminals, that consist merely in words when no more
harm ensues, moderation is no injustice.
15. In criminals of blood, if the fact be evident, severity is jus-
tice.
16. To abhor all private solicitations, of what kind soever, and
by whomever, in matters depending.
17. To charge my servants; 1st, not to interpose in any business
whatsoever; 2d, not to take more than their known fees; 3rd, not
to give any undue precedence to causes; 4th, not to recommend
counsel.
18. To be short and sparing at meals, that I be fitter for busi-
92
ness.
Embodied in this inventory of fundamental admonitions,
2Id (denoting the eighteen rules for judicial guidance set forth by Sir Matthew
Hale in the mid-1600s).
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which was drafted for judges more than three centuries ago, are
the roots of today's codes of judicial conduct. Lord Hale high-
lights, among other things, the importance of judges remaining
impartial; he cautions against deciding cases prematurely; and
he speaks of applying the law regardless of popular applause or
distaste.
For purposes more pertinent here, Lord Hale plants the
seeds for the growth of modern prohibitions against ex parte
communications by urging judges "[t]o abhor all private solicita-
tions, of what kind soever, and by whomever, in matters depend-
ing."9 3 The most obvious interpretation of "private solicitations"
would surely include attempts to bribe a judge. However, it
seems equally clear that "private solicitations" also includes
various other, non-criminal modes of ex parte communications
since the phrase is modified and its meaning is broadened by
words such as "of what kind soever" and "all."
Although Lord Hale's rules for judicial guidance are less
specific than the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon 3B(7) dealing with ex parte communications,9 his lan-
guage contributes to the foundation of the strict contemporary
rule that judicial decisions may not be based on any evidence,
consideration, or influence outside the information and argu-
ment presented in court. Lord Hale's statements most likely
gave birth to the significant statement in the ABA's Commentary
following Canon 3B(7), which reads, "[a] judge must not inde-
pendently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the
evidence presented."95
Nevertheless, despite early written hints of a trend toward
higher ethical ideals for the judiciary eventually escorting society
to today's accepted norms of judicial behavior, America saw its
first leading judges engaging in conduct which, if proven in 1998,
would be deemed universally shocking. Similar behavior now
would result in the offending judge's swift and certain removal
from office or in a public censure at the very least. Examples of
such conduct by Justices and Chief Justices of the United States
Supreme Court include the Justices' accepting and answering ex
93 Id.
' MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) (1990) ("A judge shall not
initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications... concerning a pending or
impending proceeding....").
95 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) cmt. (1990).
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parte communications; assisting Congress directly in drafting
legislation; giving direct advice to the President; presiding over
cases despite such flagrant conflicts of interest as having a fi-
nancial interest in a party; presiding over cases in which a Jus-
tice had a financial stake; deciding the very cases which had
been adjudicated by the same appellate justices when they had
earlier sat in the lower court; and hearing cases wherein one of
the lawyers was the brother, son, or brother-in-law of one of the
Justices."
During the mid-1800's in New York, the legal climate sur-
rounding the New York Court of Appeals was apparently very
different from the one we know today. The following passage
from Judge Bronson's opinion in Pierce v. Delamater97 reflects
the legal atmosphere surrounding the New York Court of Ap-
peals in 1847. The opinion concerned whether Judge Bronson
should disqualify himself from deciding an appeal from a deci-
sion of the trial court which he had rendered when he presided
over the same case at the trial level. Judge Bronson declared
that
[t]here is nothing in the nature of the thing which makes it im-
proper for a Judge to sit in review upon his own judgments. If
he is what a judge ought to be-wise enough to know that he is
fallible, and therefore ever ready to learn; great and honest
enough to discard all mere pride of opinion, and follow truth
wherever it may lead; and courageous enough to acknowledge
his errors-he is then the very best man to sit in review upon
his own judgments. He will have the benefit of a double discus-
sion. If right at the first, he will be confirmed in his opinion;
and if wrong he will be quite as likely to find it out as any one
else. But I need not labor to maintain a principle which has
been fully established, by abrogating the disqualification in
question, after it had formed a part of our fundamental law for
See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 195-200 (MacMillan Publishing Co. 1988) (discussing ques-
tionable judicial behavior of Supreme Court Justices in the nineteenth century);
Jack B. Weinstein, Limits On Judges' Learning, Speaking, and Acting: Part H
Speaking and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1994); Sandford Lev-
inson, The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835, 75 VA. L. REv. 1429,
1439-40 (1989) (book review) (giving examples of what might strike today's courts as
"rather questionable judicial behavior").
97 1 N.Y. 17 (1847).
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nearly three-fourths of a century. (Const. of 1777, Art. 32.
Const. of 1821, Art. 5, [sec] 1.)
I am of the opinion that it is both my right and duty to take part
in reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court while I was a
member of it, and shall act accordingly.9"
It is inconceivable that a present day appellate court judge
would ever assert what Judge Bronson articulately and daunt-
lessly wrote 150 years ago.' "A serious issue of public confidence
would arise today if a trial judge could hear the appeal of a case
he had presided over. This procedure should not be rein-
stated."'00
In 1924, the American Bar Association ("ABA7) promulgated
the first Canons of Judicial Ethics in the association's then forty-
seven year history. The ABA was prompted to do so, in part, by
the misconduct of a judge following the professional baseball
scandal of 1919, when the Chicago White Sox "threw" the World
Series to its adversaries, the Cincinnati Reds.' °' In the wake of
this notorious scandal, the leaders of organized baseball hired
United States District Court Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
as National Commissioner of Baseball at an annual salary of
$42,500 in addition to his regular judicial pay of $7,500.102 In
1921, the ABA censured Judge Landis for his misconduct in ac-
cepting the job as baseball commissioner and later wrote the
1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, the first formal national
code of its kind.'
The 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics contains thirty-four
separate sections, each devoted to a different aspect of behav-
ior. ' 4 Canon 17, which deals with ex parte communications,
98 Id. at 18-19.
"The practice of a judge reviewing his own decisions is now legally unaccept-
able. See Lowcher v. New York City Teacher's Retirement Sys., 429 N.E.2d 1167,
1169 (N.Y. 1981) (stating that "due process will not allow an administrative deci-
sion-maker to sit in review upon his own decisions").
'00 Weinstein, supra note 96, at 20.
'0' See Nancy L. Sholes, Note, Judicial Ethics: A Sensitive Subject, 26 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 379, 382 n.21 (1992) (noting that prior to the "Black Sox" scandal in 1919,
most members of the ABA did not feel that it was necessary to implement a code of
ethics for judges similar to the Canons of Professional Ethics drafted to regulate the
conduct of lawyers).02 See id.
103 See id. at 381-82 ("The committee intended the canons to guide behavior
rather than be an enforceable set of rules.").
10 ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924).
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reads as follows:
[A judge] should not permit private interviews, arguments or
communications designed to influence his judicial action, where
interests to be affected thereby are not represented before him,
except in cases where provision is made by law for ex parte ap-
plication.
While the conditions under which briefs of arguments are to be
received are largely matters of local rule or practice, he should
not permit the contents of such briefs presented to him to be
concealed from opposing counsel. Ordinarily all communica-
tions of counsel to the judge intended or calculated to influence
action should be made known to opposing counsel.0 5
Despite this language, disputes regarding the appropriate-
ness of ex parte communications still arose. In the process of
deciding Arnstein v. Porter0 6 in 1946, a conflict erupted behind
the scenes in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit between Judge Jerome N. Frank and Judge Charles E.
Clark concerning whether Judge Clark's act of seeking ex parte
advice from his friend, Professor Luther Noss, a Yale University
music scholar, was ethically permissible."7 The case involved a
claim that the defendant plagiarized certain tunes that were al-
legedly first written by the plaintiff.0 8 Judge Frank criticized
Judge Clark's ex parte consultation with Professor Noss, stating
that "'[a]lthough in the old civilian practice the witnesses were
heard in secret, at least each party knew who the witnesses were
and was allowed to address interrogations to them.' "'09
Later, Judge Clark seized an opportunity to "turn the tables"
on Judge Frank, criticizing him for the same transgression.
Judge Clark wrote:
"I do not believe our decision ought to be affected by somewhat
uncertain quotations from experts consulted ex parte. It is
hardly fair to the persons quoted .... In Arnstein v. Porter of
blessed memory I was roundly criticized for obtaining (for my
own personal benefit) the exact views of a musical scholar of
distinction. While I did not think the criticism well taken, I
have since tried to avoid even the appearance of transgres-
10' ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 17 (1924).
'0 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
107 MARVIN SCHICI, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 126 (Johns Hopkins Press 1970).
'08 See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467.
'09 SCHICK, supra note 107, at 128.
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sion.""I 0
To this, Judge Frank replied:
"I never criticized (and don't now) Charlie's discussing the Arn-
stein case with a musical scholar. I didn't object when Tom, a
few years ago, sought Corbin's advice. I don't see why it's wrong
to get the views of Professor Moore about Rule questions. Of
course, I shouldn't-and haven't purported to-report anything
except his tentative reactions after he had talked with me alone.
And I've suggested that all of us confer with him in such mat-
ters. In this case I referred to his tentative doubts in order to
prove that my doubts were not frivolous.""'
Judge Frank went on to say:
"I have never cited, to my colleagues, the views on a legal ques-
tion of Professors Moore, Sturges, Shulman, etc., expressed in-
formally and to me alone, as in any way authoritative. I have
suggested that such views indicate that a full discussion by
members of the court with one or the other of them might be
helpful .... It would seem then that my remarks in 1946 about
your discussion with a musician as to an issue of fact did not de-
ter you in 1951 from consulting Moore as to a question of 'law'
and reporting his views to your colleagues. Nor can I see any
reason why you shouldn't have done so .... Far from objecting,
I even urge that judges should seek for knowledge, not else-
where easily available, from experts in whom they and the court
as a whole may have confidence. This is, however, far from
drawing in such experts as part of the argumentation against
one's brethren when the court is divided in its view. What I did
in the Arnstein case... was exactly in accord with what I am
urging, I acted in Arnstein before I knew there was any division
and of course went no further as soon as it developed. I have
felt deeply, therefore, that the criticism you made of me in that
matter was entirely unjust and uncalled for."
"In our recent cases you have relied upon opinions from else-
where where we were at issue and as a means of beating down
contentions, rather than of providing usable knowledge for the
court. Further, it seems to me that you have not been fair ei-
ther to the experts or to your colleagues, since you have gotten
10 Id. at 128-29. Arguing back and forth for several years, Judge Clark and
Judge Frank could not free themselves of their disagreements on the issue of reli-
ance on outside expertise. See id.
. Id. at 129.
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offhand and curbstone or stairway opinions.""
The dialogue between these two judges reflects unsettled
attitudes regarding such a fundamental aspect of the rules
against ex parte communications, even among leaders of the ju-
diciary as recently as fifty years ago. These written exchanges
between two prominent jurists are perhaps even more surprising
in light of the clear proscriptive language of Canon 17 of the
1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics.
In 1972, the ABA revised its 1924 code. Canon 3A(4) of the
1972 Code of Judicial Conduct contains new language dealing
with ex parte communications that more closely resembles the
1990 rules. Canon 3A(4) of the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct
reads as follows:
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally inter-
ested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard ac-
cording to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate
nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may ob-
tain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to
a proceeding before him if he gives notice to the parties of the
person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords
the parties reasonable opportunity to respond."'
The Commentary following the 1972 version is completely
silent on the issue posed by this paper.
The 1990 version of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct sets
forth ex parte rules in the most detail to date. Canon 3B(7) of
the 1990 Code states:
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest
in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard
according to law. A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider
ex parte communications, or consider other communications
made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning
a pending or impending proceeding except that:
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte communications
for scheduling, administrative purposes or emergencies that
do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits
are authorized; provided:
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain
1 Id. at 129 n.13.
" MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(4) (1972).
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a procedural or tactical advantage as a result of the ex
parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all
other parties of the substance of the ex parte communi-
cation and allows an opportunity to respond.
(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert
on the law applicable to a proceeding before the judge if the
judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reason-
able opportunity to respond.
(c) A judge may consult with court personnel whose function
is to aid the judge in carrying the judge's adjudicative re-
sponsibilities or with other judges.
(d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer
separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to
mediate or settle matters pending before the judge.
(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communi-
cations when expressly authorized by law to do so. 4
The Commentary to Canon 3B(7) of the 1990 Code adds that
"[a] judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and
must consider only the evidence presented."' This comment,
which is among the first of its kind promulgated by a rule-
making body, seems to accomplish more than to cast some doubt
as to whether a judge may engage in sua sponte, ex parte library
research on scientific subjects during the decision-making proc-
ess. One could persuasively argue that the Commentary and
Canon flatly prohibit such research.
Accordingly, in order to reconcile Canon 3B(7)'s language
with any suggested new approach expressly allowing sua sponte,
ex parte research, it is critical to weave clear and carefully drawn
limits on the extent of that research. Those parameters must be
designed to avoid the obvious ethical perils occasioned by ex
parte activity. since such activity, at least at first blush, seems
114 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) (1990).
.. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7) cmt. (1990).
"0s One of the clearest and most bizarre examples of the dangers of utterly inap-
propriate ex parte activity by a juror may be found in Redd v. LaGuardia Med.
Group, P.C., N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 1996, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). In Redd, which in-
volved a medical malpractice claim, a juror admitted that she was persuaded to find
in the physician's favor, in part, because during the trial, she secretly went to a drug
store to read the label on a bottle of Maalox in order to see which side of the case its
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to be inconsistent with Canon 3B(7) and the accompanying com-
mentary.
Furthermore, by dint of the 1990 ABA Code of Judicial Con-
duct Canon 3E(1)(a), a judge must disqualify himself or herself
when "the judge has.., personal knowledge of disputed eviden-
tiary facts concerning the proceeding.""7 When a judge acquires
scientific research data from a library, ex parte, he then becomes
possessed of "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts"
and a question may arise as to whether at that point he or she
may ethically preside."8
In 1912, in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall,"9 Justice Holmes ex-
pressed a view not uncommon among judges and lawyers that
judges should not consider or look for facts beyond those pre-
sented by lawyers in their briefs or other written material.2 '
Chief Justice Warren Burger and the seven member majority in
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company v. Collins,2' reemphasized
that message by cautioning judges not to look for facts beyond
those adduced by the lawyers." Like-minded purists, who
would permit only the lowest possible levels of judicial intrusion
into the adversary process, would presumably oppose, or at least
be reluctant to endorse, any suggested new rule that would allow
judges leeway to engage in sua sponte, ex parte research in the
course of the decision-making process.
IV. APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYSIS
OF PRESENT STANDARDS AS EXPRESSED IN CONTEMPORARY
RULES, CASES, AND LITERATURE
The concept of due process is an important aspect of the
analysis of this article since it is inextricably interwoven with
this article's core issue. Among our legal system's most funda-
mental and well-established underpinnings is the principle that
parties to lawsuits must be accorded due process of law. In
contents would support. See id. As a result of the juror's actions, the jury's verdict in
favor of the defendant was vacated and a new trial was ordered. See id.
... MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1)(a) (1990).
", Id.
1 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
120 Id. at 64.
121 432 U.S. 46 (1977).
122 Id. at 57 (holding that no statute, rule, or decision authorized the lower
court's reliance on data not tested by the means of the adversary process).
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Baldwin v. Hale,' 3 the Court, expressing the crux of procedural
due process, stated that "[c]ommon justice requires that no man
shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and
an opportunity to make his defence [sic]."'2 Moreover, this basic
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' If one were
to propose that, while a case is sub judice, judges should be given
license to explore written scientific research information, sua
sponte and ex parte, it would be necessary to blend any such
authority with settled notions of due process.
The condemnation of ex parte communications is designed to
assure that a court will only consider evidence that the parties in
an adversarial environment have had the opportunity to scruti-
nize, test, contradict, discredit, and correct.' The prohibition is
also designed to maximize the likelihood that courts will render
accurate and unbiased decisions based on a complete record on
which an appellate court can rely in order to thoroughly review
the matter.!" Furthermore, this ban seeks to give litigants an
'23 68 U.S. 223 (1863).
r2 Id. at 233; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (stating that
"W[the constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to
follow a fair process of decisionmaking"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1877)
(holding that "[iif, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex
parte against non-residents and absent parties, upon mere publication of process,
which, in the great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested,
could be upheld and enforced, they would be the constant instruments of fraud and
oppression"), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
'' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (asserting that notice is essential to a party being afforded an
opportunity to be heard, which is "[tihe fundamental requisite of due process of
law").
126 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977) (holding
that the lower court's reliance on data that it requested from an outside source was
improper because the data "had not been examined and tested by the traditional
methods of the adversary process"); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDIcIAL CONDUCT
AND ETHICS § 6.01 (1990) (discussing the purpose of the ban on ex parte communi-
cations and noting that such communications "deprive the absent party of the right
to respond and be heard"). Indeed, in advocating a broader use of judicial notice as
an evidentiary device, legal scholars have recognized the importance of giving ad-
vance notice to an adversary when a party plans to advocate that the court judicially
notice a fact urged as "undisputed7 so that the adversary has an opportunity to
challenge the claim of indisputability. See Arthur John Keeffe et al., Sense and Non-
sense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664, 668 (1950).
127 See generally SHAMAN, supra note 126, at § 6.01 (discussing the reasons be-
hind the ban on exparte communications).
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opportunity to expose a witness's possible bias.128 Judges who
have ignored this legal and ethical stricture have either created
reversible error, have been removed from a case, have been cen-
sured and criticized, or have been removed from office. 129
Recognizing due process requirements, Canon 3B(7)(b) of the
1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct permits outside con-
sultations with disinterested experts on the law only if notice is
given to the parties.13' However, this principle and its restric-
tions governing ex parte communications have been altered or
refined by some states.
For example, the Illinois Legislature deleted Canon 3B(7)(b)
in 1993, prohibiting all consultations by judges with outside legal
'2 See generally id. at § 6.07 (describing situations in which judges' ex parte
communications with witnesses are improper).
'2 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (stating that a
judge's "alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudi-
cial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
judge learned from his participation in the case") (citing Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921)); S.S. v. Wakefield, 764 P.2d 70, 73-74 (Colo. 1988)
(classifying the conduct of a judge in initiating an ex parte communication with a
party concerning a pending proceeding as improper, but not so problematic as to re-
quire his removal since actual or apparent bias was not present); In re Inquiry Con-
cerning a Judge Richard E. Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1270 (Fla. 1983) (holding that a
judge who engages in an improper ex parte communication should be removed from
the bench); Stivers v. Knox County Dept. of Pub. Welf., 482 N.E.2d 748, 749-51 (Ind.
1985) (establishing that a recusal or change of venue motion denied by a judge who
has personal knowledge of a case over which he presides is cause for reversible er-
ror); State v. Romano, 662 P.2d 406, 407 (Wash. 1983) (holding that a judge commit-
ted reversible error when he received information about a defendant by way of an ex
parte statement before sentencing); In re Honorable A'lan Hutchinson, Pierce
County Dist. Ct. No. 3, CJC No. 93-1652-F-47, 1995 WL 902265 at *3 (Wash. Com.
Jud. Cond. Feb. 3, 1995) (holding an ex parte investigation by a judge could result in
the judge being censured); see also Price Bros. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 629
F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that a judge should recuse himself when he
has personal knowledge of material facts in dispute); State v. Leslie, 666 P.2d 1072,
1073 (Ariz. 1983) (stating that if a judge disqualifies himself because of an ex patte
investigation, whether a new trial shall be ordered is in the discretion of the succes-
sor); In re Jordan, 622 P.2d 297 (Or.), clarified, 624 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Or. 1981)
(insinuating that the judge should have disqualified himself because the relation-
ship between the judge and the defendant was more than casual); SHAMAN ET AL.,
supra note 126, at §§ 5.07 - 5.08 (discussing when a judge may conduct an ex parte
proceeding and the remedies available to a litigant when a judge has unduly relied
on such proceedings). However, remedial actions are not appropriate in every in-
stance in which a judge is a party to an ex parte communication. See Parrillo v.
Parrillo, 495 A.2d 683, 686 (R.I. 1985) (noting that where the merits of the case are
not discussed, "'conferences on housekeeping items show neither a prejudicial state
of mind nor a denial of a fair hearing' ") (quoting Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 375 A.2d
911, 918 (R.I. 1977)).
"0 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(b) (1990).
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experts, because it was believed that outside consultations with
experts too closely resembled a previously abolished procedure of
using masters in chancery.13' Alabama, on the other hand, has
allowed more flexibility to judges who consult with disinterested
experts on the law. Canon 3 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial
Ethics permits judges to "obtain the advice of a disinterested and
impartial expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before
him, provided, however, a judge should use discretion in such
cases and, if the judge considers that justice would require it,
and [sic] should give notice to the parties of the person consulted
and the substance of the advice, and afford the parties a reason-
able opportunity to respond."132 The difference between the Ala-
bama provision and the 1990 ABA version is that Alabama does
not require a judge to notify the parties or attorneys of an out-
side consultation. This is decidedly at odds with the prevailing
national view that detailed notification must be given to the
parties, which is expressed in the vast majority of states' written
ethics principles. 3 In Arizona, while the Arizona Code of Judi-
cial Conduct Canon 3B(7)(b) appears not to require judges to no-
tify the parties in a pending case when the judge has consulted
with outside legal experts, its Commentary confirms that Ari-
zona's policy remains consistent with the prevailing view-that
is, a judge may only consult outside legal experts ex parte if the
judge notifies the parties of the exchange, the substance of any
advice received, and an opportunity to comment. T'4 In contrast,
Justice Denecke of the Oregon Supreme Court criticized ex parte
communications altogether and has stated that "[e]x parte con-
versations or correspondence with experts, law teachers or oth-
erwise, is unfair and can be misleading. The facts given may be
incomplete or inaccurate, the problem can be incorrectly stated
or other matters can be incorrectly stated."'35
'3' Generally, a master in chancery is an officer of the court who acts as an as-
sistant to a judge and inquires into matters referred by the court; the master in
chancery takes testimony, examines accounts, assesses damages, and then reports
those findings to the referring court.
1"2 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF ALABAMA Canon 3A(4).
' See supra note 130, and accompanying text.
"34 See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF ARIZONA Canon 3B(7) & commentary.
135 Arno H. Denecke, The Judiciary Needs Your Help Teachers, 22 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 197, 203 (1969) (discussing how law professors should be assisting the judici-
ary); see also Andrew L. Kaufinan, Judicial Ethics: The Less-Often Asked Questions,
64 WASH. L. REV. 851, 855-59 (1989) (arguing in favor of maintaining the prohibition
against judges consulting with law professors regarding issues in pending cases).
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In 1975, the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, in its Informal Opinion 1346,
wrote that the strictures in Canon 3, concerning ex parte dia-
logue with outside experts on the law, apply with equal force if a
judge consults law school research centers. This opinion
strengthens the notion that all parties in a case must be given
access to sources of a judge's knowledge gained during the course
of a pending proceeding about the issues being litigated.
136
Similarly, under Canon 3A(4) of Louisiana's Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge may not "accept in any case briefs, documents
or written communications intended or calculated to influence
his [or her] action unless the contents are promptly made known
to all parties."137 This general language suggests that if a Louisi-
ana judge, sua sponte and ex parte, ventures into a library or logs
on the internet to read scientific research information relevant to
a pending decision, the judge would be obligated to "promptly
[notify] all parties" of anything found that will play a part in the
lawsuit's outcome. The spirit of the Louisiana rule also seems to
include a notice requirement regarding scientific literature dis-
covered sua sponte and ex parte that will correspond with the
rule's manifest objective to afford due process to all parties and
to ensure the parties an opportunity to comment upon any rele-
vant information that the judge has procured at any point during
the pendency of the case.
One notion common to various states' rules is the following
principle contained in the Commentary to Maryland's Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(5): "The proscription against com-
munications concerning a proceeding includes communications
from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not par-
ticipants in the proceeding."'3 8 The recurring theme in all state
codes of ethics is to limit a judge's exposure to ex parte communi-
cations during the pendency of a case 39 because any relevant in-
formation obtained extrajudicially has the inherent danger of
conveying misinformation or creating bias on the part of the
's" ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. No.
1346 (1975).
'3 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF LOUISIANA Canon 3A(4) (1997).
's CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF MARYLAND Canon 3 cmt. (1997).
189 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 582-82 (1966) (stating that
the rules concerning judicial disqualification do not require the recusal of a judge
who forms an opinion about a case as the result of information acquired during and
from within its proceedings).
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judge-a bias to which the parties cannot react if they are oblivi-
ous to it. However, once a judge acquires information extrajudi-
cially, thereby awakening a concomitant risk that she will be bi-
ased or influenced in favor of or against one party, it seems clear,
logical, and fair that the obligation to disclose the information is
born and recusal may be required.40
As noted earlier, in the codes of judicial conduct of many
states,' the rules or commentaries provide that judges may not
independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only
the evidence presented at trial.' This precept does not, by its
express terms, apply to written information obtained by the
judge, ex parte, from published research data or scientific litera-
ture.' However, logic dictates that this principle also encom-
passes information in scientific and published research literature
acquired by a judge, sua sponte and ex parte, during the pen-
dency of a case, because the dangers posed by receiving such in-
formation-either secretly from a library or the internet, secretly
from other persons, or secretly from independently investigating
facts in some other way-are all the same. All methods can pro-
foundly affect a judge's opinion and decision and can unques-
tionably deprive an unsuspecting litigant of the right to know
what the judge has learned and an opportunity to respond and
be heard.
Oregon's Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2-102(D), through a
catchall provision, requires a judge to "promptly disclose to the
parties any communication not otherwise prohibited by this rule
that will or reasonably may influence the outcome of any adver-
sary proceeding."'" That sentence captures the essence of the
universal goal of contemporary state and federal judicial ethics
codes on the subject of ex parte communications-that is, to as-
sure all litigants procedural due process.
140 See id. at 583 (stating that a judge should disqualify himself when an extra-
judicial source reveals information regarding the merits of the case); see also Berger
v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921) (enforcing rules of disqualification where
the risk of prejudice was clear by virtue of statements of the presiding trial judge
revealing his misinformation and bias).
141 See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (describing the ABA rules and
some state rules concerning exparte investigations).
142 See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3 (1990).
14 See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (suggesting some instances
when ex parte communications are appropriate).
144 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF OREGON Rule 2-102(D) (1997).
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The Tennessee Judicial Ethics Committee, in opinion 97-1
dated January 29, 1997, was asked to consider whether the con-
fidential financial information and pedigree data about parents,
contained in a new computer system implemented by the Ten-
nessee Department of Human Services to assist in enforcing
child support payments, may be accessed, ex parte, by judges
who hear and decide family law matters.'45 The committee held
that judges may not acquire information in the manner described
because "U]udicial knowledge upon which a decision may be
based is not the personal knowledge of the judge, but the cogni-
zance of certain facts the judge becomes aware of by virtue of the
legal procedures in which he plays a neutral role."4 ' The Com-
mittee cited the Tennessee Supreme Court's reasoning in
Vaughn v. Shelby Williams of Tennessee, Inc. 4 7 In Vaughn, the
court said:
It seems appropriate that when the trial judge becomes the
source of information and when a decision is ultimately influ-
enced by that information, the parties should have the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine in order to impeach the source of the
evidence or otherwise persuade an impartial trier of fact that
the court's observations are, for whatever reason, inaccurate,
just as they would any other witness.148
Many state courts have encountered the issue of whether a
judge's sua sponte, ex parte research has violated due process
protections. In Matter of Fuchsberg,"49 an associate judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, the State's highest court, was cen-
sured for consulting with law professors by showing them inter-
nal draft opinions concerning a pending case written by other
Judges of the Court of Appeals. The judge did this without the
consent of the authors and, probably more significantly, without
notifying the attorneys or the parties to the lawsuit.5 ° Moreover,
in the court's subsequent official opinions published under his
own name, Judge Fuchsberg inserted substantial portions of
language that he had taken directly from the drafts secretly
145 Tennessee Judicial Ethics Committee, Op. 97-1 (1997). [UTL]
146 See State v. Hort, 911 S.W. 2d 371, 377 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
147 813 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. 1991).
148 Id. at 134.
149 426 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Ct. Jud. 1978) (per curiam).
" See id. at 646-47 (stating that a judge who consulted with law professors
twelve different times has violated New York's Rules and Canons).
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submitted to him by the law professors. 5' As a result of these
and other transgressions, Judge Fuchsberg was publicly cen-
sured.'52 The decision condemning his conduct is relevant to the
issue here because a similarity arguably exists between what he
did and the act of a judge who, sua sponte and unbeknownst to
the parties, reads and relies upon scientific research data in the
course of deciding a case involving questions posed or answered
by that research. In both instances, the risk of prejudice is great
and the parties have no opportunity to challenge the data. In
The Matter of. The Hon. A'lan Hutchinson, Pierce County District
Court No. 3,153 the Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct
censured a judge for, among other things, "initiat[ing] an ex
parte, independent factual investigation about gender reassign-
ment surgery... without prior or contemporaneous notice to the
petitioners."" The judge consulted with various medical socie-
ties and entities about the medical and legal issues involved in
the case regarding the petitioners' name-change, which was
commenced while petitioners were undergoing "gender reas-
signment therapy."'55 The judge then used the information ac-
quired in the course of the legal proceedings.'56 For this ex parte
activity and for other reasons, he was censured.'57 The same
logic resulting in that sanction calls for reasonable but strict
limits to be written into any new rule that permits judges to en-
gage in ex parte searches for written scientific research data
while a case is pending or impending.
One of the few writings that has directly touched on the cen-
tral issue of this paper is entitled Limits on Judges Learning,
Speaking and Acting - Part I - Tentative First Thoughts: How
Many Judges Learn.'58 In that essay, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge Jack B. Wein-
stein raised a host of questions about the ethical implications of
's' See id. at 646.
152 See id. at 648.
"3 CJC No. 93-1652-F-47, 1995 WL 902265 (Wash. Com. Jud. Cond. Feb. 3,
1995).
' Id. at *1.
1 Id.
15 See id. at *1-2.
157 See id. at *3-*4.
8 See Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning: Speaking and Acting-
Part I-Tentative First Thoughts: How Many Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539,
556-62 (1994) (discussing the topic of judicial ethics and how judges should learn
about a particular subject).
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judges acquiring information from a wide variety of sources, such
as judicial and other conferences, seminars, and even private
dinner table conversations with family members and friends.159
He asserted that each informational environment has the poten-
tial to raise disquieting ethical issues. 160 He also urged, however,
that despite these ethical concerns, judges must be permitted
meaningful interaction with the outside world in order to con-
stantly learn and expand intellectually. 6' Finally, he concluded
that most types of extrajudicial contact can be ethically resolved
without isolating judges from the ideas and information sur-
rounding them. "2 Thus, he succinctly wrote: "[r]isk-for-risk,
however, a thinking, informed judge is far less dangerous than
one pickled in his own, ever-so-ethical views. " "
In United States v. Bonds," Judge Danny J. Boggs of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed
attitudes similar to those of Judge Weinstein. The issue in
Bonds involved the admissibility of DNA evidence. The Gov-
ernment requested that Judge Boggs recuse himself from consid-
ering the appeal due to his attendance at educational confer-
ences on the subject, his informal discussion of DNA with a
scientist, and his familiarity with material on DNA." In deny-
ing the motion for recusal, he wrote:
[Wle would all be required to cancel our subscriptions to law
reviews and newspapers, let alone specialized journals of any
sort .... To the extent that a judge remains interested at all in
the events of society, a judge will inevitably be exposed to mat-
ters relating, in greater or lesser degree, to interesting areas of
the law on which the judge may be called to rule. However,
such general knowledge does not constitute extra-judicial
See id. (discussing different ethical violations according to judges)
See id.161 See id. at 543 (asserting that judges must be allowed and encouraged to ac-
quire information of varying viewpoints to improve themselves and the entire judi-
cial process); id. at 542-56 (explaining the various avenues through which judges
may expand their knowledge, which include reading magazines, law review articles,
newsletters, reports, advertisements, and attending training seminars and continu-
ing education programs).
'6' See id. at 565 (advocating a judiciary which is not completely closed off from
the world and suggesting safeguards to ensure a fair and impartial judiciary, includ-
ing the encouragement of judges to acquire general knowledge from relatively neu-
tral sources and the creation and funding of judicial education programs).
13 Id at 562.
16 18 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir. 1994).
1 See id. at 1328-31 (delineating the history of the case).
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knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts .... Nor does past par-
ticipation in conferences... even when that participation is re-
corded in print, indicate bias or extra-judicial knowledge, any
more than the fact that a judge has written previous law review
articles or opinions in a certain field.'6
Although Judge Boggs' comments refer to knowledge of a
contested issue acquired when a case is not pending or impend-
ing, his language implies that different considerations would in-
fluence this ethical consideration if a judge learned information
about a contested issue, ex parte, while the case is pending or
impending.
When Judge Weinstein's sage advice is pressed beyond its
reasonable limits, a scenario similar to the one in In re Bonin'67
is likely to occur. In that case, the Chief Justice of the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court was disciplined, in part, for attending a
public meeting to raise funds for and otherwise support a group
of homosexual defendants against whom criminal charges were
pending in the superior court." The principal speaker was Gore
Vidal, whose lecture, entitled "Sex and Politics in Massachu-
setts," discussed in a critical and biased fashion the State's
prosecution of these criminal charges. The court held that Jus-
tice Bonin should not have knowingly placed himself in a posi-
tion in which he was likely to hear ex parte and partisan com-
ments concerning pending cases.6 9 The court stated that "[b]y
his attendance at the meeting the Chief Justice... exposed him-
self to ex parte or one-sided statements and argumentation on
matters before his court."7 °
The Bonin court addressed the difficult balance that judges
must vigilantly maintain between being well-informed and ap-
propriately involved in society and the countervailing obligation
to remain detached from environments in which reasonable
questions about their impartiality may arise.Y This obligation
"6 Id- at 1331.
167 378 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1978).
'6 See id. at 672-73 (outlining the charges and emphasizing that Chief Justice
Brown knew or should have known that proceeds from ticket sales were used to
support the defendant's case pending in the Superior Court).
19 See id. at 672 (explaining the counts against the judge, particularly the fact
that discussions that evening included criticism of the judicial process and discus-
sion of the merits of the case and the fairness of the trial)
170 Id. at 683.
171 See id. at 682-83 (maintaining that the judge must take necessary steps "to
avoid extrajudicial conduct... [which] would trench on matters pending in his
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also includes the duty to avoid exposure to sources of relevant ex
parte information pertaining to matters which they are deciding
or which are impending.' Thus, the court said:
It was suggested during the proceedings that judges should not
be deterred from informing themselves about contentious issues
of social importance, and that judges are helped in their profes-
sional thought and judgment by acquainting themselves with
ideas and feelings current in their communities. Hence, it was
argued, the Chief Justice's attendance at the meeting... was
not only not exceptionable but was commendable .... We agree
emphatically that "[c]omplete separation of a judge from extra-
judicial activities is neither possible nor wise; he should not be-
come isolated from the society in which he lives. 73
The court, however, emphasized that a judge should not
knowingly enter situations in which ex parte comments of others
"trench on matters pending in his court.",
74
In an article analyzing the use of social science evidence at
trial, Judge Joseph A. Colquitt emphasized that notice and an
opportunity for challenging scientific evidence is critically impor-
tant since our justice system relies principally on an adversarial
exchange designed to act as a filtering process for incoming evi-
dence, mostly by way of cross examination. 175  Judge Colquitt
touched on the core issue of this article in the following excerpt
and effectively articulated an important aspect of the debate:
What happens when the trial counsel fails to prove a fact that is
materially relevant to the issues in the litigation? Without be-
coming too involved in the question, there are great differences
of opinions about the proper role of the courts. Justice Holmes
[in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall] felt that attorneys have a duty to
furnish the court with all relevant facts. He believed that if at-
torneys deliberately fail to produce needed evidence, the court
should not institute its own inquiry. There are, however, two
court" while emphasizing, however, the undesirability of a judge's total isolation
from the greater community).
72 See id. at 682 (stating that the requirement that judges remain removed and
neutral "is at the heart of the Code of Judicial Conduct").
'7 Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
174 Id.
'7 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30
ARIZ. L. REV. 51, 69 (1988) (stating that the use of expert witnesses is the preferred
method to present social evidence since it provides the opportunity for cross-
examination on which the adversarial model of the American justice system relies so
heavily).
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opposing views of the role of the courts. One theory is that the
litigants control the lawsuit and determine the issues to be de-
cided. The other view is that the courts have the ultimate re-
sponsibility to decide cases regardless of whether the appropri-
ate issues are addressed by the litigants. In a typical
automobile accident case, the first approach may be more ap-
propriate; in a lawsuit involving public policy, statutory inter-
pretation, or constitutional rights, however, the second ap-
176proach may be more appropriate.
Some members of the judiciary have suggested that judges
should be allowed to exceed the limited boundaries drawn by
most current judicial conduct codes.177 For example, some rec-
ommendations provide that judges should, in certain situations,
be empowered to consult with legal experts outside the parties'
presence,17 that judges should be permitted to call upon inde-
pendent nonlegal experts not summoned as witnesses by the
parties for advice,7 ' or that appellate judges should be allowed to
employ their own staff of scientific and technical experts to assist
the court, ex parte, with complex issues of science and technol-
ogy.' In other situations, judges have used special masters,
public hearings, or interviews with victims to acquire informa-
tion deemed relevant to a lawsuit.''
Differences of opinion exist regarding the extent to which
judges may acquire ex parte information and the circumstances
176 Id. at 73-74 (citations omitted).
17 See Harhut, supra note 13, at 695 (mentioning a survey which indicated that
"Mtvirtually all judges ... felt that the quality of justice could be enhanced by allow-
ing ex parte communication in certain situations").
178 See Weinstein, supra note 158, at 563 (articulating the ability of a judge to
"consult with a disinterested expert on the law," provided that parties are granted
notice and an opportunity to respond).
179 See FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (authorizing a judge to appoint expert witnesses,
sua sponte, but requiring that full notice of the experts' findings be given to the
parties and that an opportunity be available for the parties or the court to call the
expert to testify subject to the right of cross-examination).
180 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 547-553 (1974) (noting the need for experts, masters
and "aides" to assist the court in the decision-making process and proposing that
appellate courts have an "aide" who would be available to advise a court so that it
could better understand the record).
181 See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 554-60 (explaining the traditional position
which limits the amount of assistance that a judge can receive from external sources
while emphasizing that both the complexity of mass tort litigation today and the in-
creased responsibilities placed on the judiciary require a judge to have a complete
understanding of a case in order to protect parties and to realize the far-reaching
significance of the decision rendered).
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under which they may do so while a case is pending or impend-
ing.'82 Notwithstanding, a consensus has developed that trial
judges faced with difficult, complex issues of science ought to be
allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, to seek scientific re-
search and other information not supplied by the attorneys, par-
ticularly in cases that involve issues likely to have far-reaching
impact. Such sua sponte, ex parte research should be allowed
only if judicial exploration outside the record is subject to strict
procedural controls designed to honor and protect the parties'
due process rights.
A judge whose gaze does not lift from the well of the courtroom
and the pages of the lawyer's brief may fail to see the full sig-
nificance of the case at bar. In mass tort cases the social reali-
ties contextual to the details of the litigation bear on the utility
of judicial decisions.'83
V. RECOMMENDATION: MODIFICATION OF CURRENT ETHICS
RuLEs
"A rigid conception of the judge as presiding passively and
neutrally over an adversarial proceeding in which the litigants
bear the whole burden of presentation is sometimes inaccurate
and unwise."
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein8 4
As we near the twenty-first century and as science continues
exploding into a kaleidoscope of limitless activity and heightened
discovery, judges will find it increasingly demanding, if not
overwhelming, to remain adequately informed in order to resolve
the new, complex, momentous, and profound questions they will
inevitably confront. Accordingly, the rules of judicial conduct
should be refined and amended to enable judges to render deci-
sions reflecting society's mature and informed judgment.'85 One
'82 See Colquitt, supra note 175, at 73 (noting the existence of "great differences
of opinion about the proper role of the courts"); see also Harhut, supra note 13, at
695 (summarizing the agreement among the majority of judges that the admini-
stration of justice could be improved by granting judges the ability to engage in ex
parte communication, particularly when limited to questions of law).
1" Weinstein, supra note 3, at 559 (citation omitted).
184 Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
a' See Michael J. Saks, Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works, 75 IOWA
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way to realize that goal is to allow judges, when they deem it
necessary in lawsuits involving difficult questions of technologi-
cal or social science, to look beyond evidence presented by the at-
torneys. Any such license must honor the parties' due process
rights and must satisfactorily answer certain practical ques-
tions.8 '
To begin, any new rule must, by its terms, only affect a
judge's independent research on an issue of science while a case
involving that issue is actually pending or impending-that is,
when the judge becomes aware that a case containing the issue
is pending or will likely be brought before the court within a rea-
sonable time. The central thesis of this article does not implicate
the knowledge that a judge acquires prior to having a reason to
believe that the newly-acquired data will affect the outcome of
an actual case or controversy over which the judge will preside.18 7
Any proposed rule must also specify which scientific re-
search materials that are outside of the court record that will
come within the rule's purview. A new edict should apply to all
relevant materials, including materials only tangentially con-
nected to the issue in the case, but only if the judge believes in
good faith that the materials' content is likely to have a signifi-
cant impact on the outcome of the case.
Due process demands that parties be notified of all non-legal
materials that were acquired during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings and that contain scientific research information not
cited by the parties on which the judge intends to rely. Also, due
process requires that the parties be given adequate time either
to comment or to submit responses for the judge to review. The
L. REV. 1011, 1028 (1990) (noting that the current Model Code of Judicial Conduct
allows a court to secure a disinterested expert's advice as long as the court provides
the parties with notice of the identity of the person consulted, the advice received,
and an opportunity to be heard).
'8 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 3, at 557. Judge Weinstein disclosed that he
made known to the parties any of his outside readings relevant to the issues in the
Agent Orange cases by filing them and thereby making them available to the liti-
gants. See id The judge recognized that the parties may not have otherwise known
of his meetings with a specialist in the Agent Orange hearings, see id.
187 I have always made it a practice to inform lawyers in a pending case when I
am familiar with a specific writing or theory relevant to an issue of science before
me, and I invite them to comment or submit other data for me to read. However, I
would not advocate making that practice a part of any ethics rule because it would
be impossible to enforce in a manner that is beneficial to the parties and at the same
time fair to judges.
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rule should not apply to materials that do not play an apprecia-
ble role in the formation of the judge's conclusions.
The issue becomes increasingly complex when considering
the proposal made by Monahan and Walker that courts should
accord "well supported" scientific research a weight equal to le-
gal precedent. 8' Such a suggestion is faulty, given the differ-
ences between case law and scientific research. For lawyers and
judges, case law is an objective and easily identifiable body of
knowledge void of ambiguity. Of course, the weight that a court
gives to any legal precedent depends on the level and location of
the court issuing the decision, the soundness of its reasoning, the
similarity between the facts in the cited opinion and those in the
case at bar and the frequency with which the precedent has been
followed by other courts.8 9 Comparatively, "well-supported" sci-
entific research, notwithstanding Monahan and Walker's con-
trary contentions, is more subjective as a concept or as a body of
knowledge. It is not unreasonable to suggest that most lawyers
and judges would not normally feel qualified to determine
whether scientific research is "well supported." This is likely to
be especially troublesome for judges who have only minimal sci-
entific training and experience. This problem was recognized by
Monahan and Walker in their following statement:
Our confidence [in judges' ability to evaluate scientific research]
is not without limits. Whether a judge can adequately evaluate
social science research used as a social framework depends upon
both the particular judge doing the evaluation and the particu-
lar piece of research being evaluated. Occasions may arise
when the complexity of the research exceeds the ability of the
judge to evaluate it intelligently.'9"
In order to treat "well supported" scientific research and
'as See Social Authority, supra note 13, at 478 (advancing the idea "that social
science research, when used to create a legal rule, is more analogous to 'law' than to
Tact,' and hence should be treated much as courts treat legal precedent).
1'9 See Walker & Monahan, supra note 58, at 590-91 (explaining the factors
considered by courts when determining the importance of and effect given to legal
precedent).
'o Id. at 591 n.113. Walker and Monahan assert that "the risk of error is such
that, as a last resort, some methods of providing assistance to the court in evaluat-
ing the research must be found." Social Authority, supra note 13, at 512; see gener-
ally Social Authority, supra note 13, at 508-12 (examining whether judges possess
the requisite competence and ability to make determinations correctly based on
complex research). Use of a court-appointed advisor is one method of providing as-
sistance to the court in evaluating complex information acquired through research.
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case law as equal forms of precedent, the justice system would
have to create a reliable and relatively convenient procedure to
determine which research material is indeed "well supported"
and which is not. Plainly, to this writer at least, this determi-
nation must provide a meaningful opportunity for the participa-
tion of the parties in order to be consistent with due process re-
quirements. The requirements of due process render it difficult,
if not inherently impossible procedurally, to allow a judge's ex
parte consideration of "well supported" scientific research to be
treated with the same force and effect as a judge's routine ex
parte consideration of case law.'9 ' Nevertheless, Monahan and
Walker present a strong argument at some length in favor of al-
lowing "social authority" and case law equal treatment as prece-
dent.
However, after serving eighteen years on the bench, includ-
ing a significant amount of involvement in judicial training and
education, both as a student and as a faculty member, and after
an additional eighteen years as a practicing lawyer and judicial
law clerk involved almost daily in the court system, this writer is
convinced that few judges possess the academic credentials or
the necessary experience and training in scientific disciplines to
separate competently high quality, intricate scientific research
from research that is flawed. Judges, therefore, need the help of
the lawyers and the expert witnesses that they summon, but
they require this help in the context of, and in the confines of,
the fact-finding strengths of the adversary system. This is so be-
cause the judge's decisions are often far-reaching and involve
difficult and unfamiliar subjects requiring sophisticated knowl-
edge. Finally, not only do these decisions sometimes have far
reaching consequences, but they always directly affect the par-
ties in a pending lawsuit. There is nothing to be gained by de-
priving parties of an opportunity to scrutinize and challenge any
factual material that a judge will consider in arriving at a deci-
sion.
A judge should be given the discretion, as per protocol, to de-
termine at what point in the case he or she is required to disclose
the identity of items read ex parte. However, disclosure should
'9' This writer is of the opinion that scientific research results which are men-
tioned in case law may be read exparte. By inclusion in a legal opinion, the research
information itself-without thereby necessarily being deemed reliable-has become
a part of "case law" to which judges unquestionably have unfettered access.
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be required in ample time for the parties to read the material
and offer any oral or written comments to the court, at the
judge's discretion, or to allow the lawyers an opportunity to offer
additional material responsive and relevant to the ex parte ma-
terial that the judge has disclosed.
It is possible to permit sua sponte judicial journeys into the
library or on the internet during the decision-making process
while remaining faithful to due process standards and the spirit,
language, and objectives of modern judicial conduct rules. That
freedom can only enhance a judge's ability to understand com-
plex technical or scientific issues. Such research is more effi-
cient and less costly than requiring litigants to invite live experts
to explain scientific theory, particularly if the need for such so-
phisticated input arises in courts located in remote geographical
areas.
I propose that judicial ethics codes be amended to include
the following provision:
A trial judge may, sua sponte and ex parte, search for and read
research material and other literature, not presented or cited by
the parties, concerning issues of science or technology directly
applicable or relevant to a pending or impending proceeding be-
fore the judge; provided the judge gives notice to the parties of
the material and literature consulted and, in a manner within
the judge's discretion, affords them reasonable time to comment
and submit other relevant material. This provision shall only
apply to material found ex parte and on which the judge intends
to rely for a decision about the admissibility of physical or social
scientific and technological evidence in a case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whenever a complex question of science or technology
emerges in litigation-one likely to have a far-reaching impact
beyond the immediate interests of the parties-conscientious
judges will be prone to seek more information, sua sponte, to add
to their understanding. It is therefore imperative for modern
society to include, within its governing rules structure, an ethi-
cally appropriate vehicle for judges to acquire, consider, and rely
on that information. "The ethical problems.., suggest the need
for modifying the legal process to match the technological, eco-
nomic, and sociological conditions of today. Fortunately, we have
in our legal tradition strong foundations of fairness upon which
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to remodel procedural, substantive, and ethical strictures."1 2
The recommendations set forth in this article may, and should,
be implemented in order to allow judges to reach beyond the rec-
ord in certain situations while still protecting the due process
rights of the parties.
192 Weinstein, supra note 3, at 471.
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